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Abstract 
A new identity-based short signature(IBS) is proposed in this paper. The new scheme is constructed in the standard 
model and has short public parameters and private keys. In addition, the size of the signature achieves 320 bits, which 
is much more efficient than the existing IBS schemes. Under the n-Computational Diffie-Hellman Exponent 
Problem(n-CDH), the new scheme is provable security. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [CEIS 2011] 
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1. Introduction 
Short signature schemes are needed in environments with space and bandwidth constraints. There are 
going to be a lot of devices exchanging messages with each other in these environments, e.g., PDAs, cell 
phones, RFID chips, sensor networks and vehicle-2-vehicle communications [1, 2]. Short signature is an 
active research area. In [3,4], one encodes a part of the message into the signature thus shortening the total 
length of the message-signature pair. For long messages, one can then achieve a DSA signature overhead 
of length of 160 bits. Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [5] used a totally new approach to design such short 
digital signatures in 2001. A number of desirable schemes were proposed at present. In these systems, the 
binding between the public key and the identity of the signer is obtained via a digital certificate. Shamir showed 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +86-29-88202860; fax: +86-29-88204396. 
E-mail address: leyouzhang77@yahoo.com.cn. 
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
3446  Leyou Zhang et al. / Procedia Engineering 15 (2011) 3445 – 34492 Leyou Zhang et al/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–000 
that it would be more efficient if there was no need for such a binding [6]. It is called identity-based 
cryptography. Identity-based encryption (IBE) was introduced firstly in [6]. The first identity-based signature 
(IBS) scheme was proposed by Shamir[6], but the size of generated signature is quite large, which has 
2048 bits when one utilizes a 1024-bit RSA modulus. Guillou and Quisquater [7] improved Shamir’s 
scheme and shortened the signature size to 1184 bits when one uses 1024-bit RSA modulus and 160-bit 
hash function. Boneh and Franklin [8] founded that bilinear pairings on elliptic curves could be used to 
make ID-based encryption scheme possible and practical. Now, many IBS schemes [10-16] are proposed 
based on bilinear pairings. These signatures generated by [10-16] are much shorter and simpler than 
signatures from schemes in [7,9], which achieve approximately 320-bit size.  However, these schemes are 
provable secure in the random oracles model. Many results have shown that security in the random oracle 
model does not imply the security in the real world. Security in the standard model usually provides a 
higher security level than security in the random oracle model. The well known construction of IBS in the 
standard model was proposed in [17]. It is based on the Waters’s scheme[18]. So the public keys size is 
much larger than the previous schemes. In addition, the size of the proposed scheme achieves 480 bits. 
Our Contributions A natural extension of the efforts is to provide a more efficient scheme. We propose 
a new scheme in this paper. Our scheme contains some desirable features over the previous works, such as 
constructed in standard model and short public keys and private keys. In addition, The size of signature 
achieves 320 bits, which is more efficient than the existing schemes. Under the n-CDH assumption, our 
scheme is provably secure against selective-identity and message attack. 
2. Preliminaries  
2.1. Hardness Assumption  
Definition 1 (n-Exponent Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem) Given a group G of prime order p
with generator g and elements gα , 2gα ,L , ngα G∈ , where  is selected uniformly at random from α
pZ and n ≥  1, the n-CDH problem in G is to compute 
1n
gα
+
.
Definition 2 We say that the (t, ) n-CDH assumption holds in a group G, if no adversary running in 
time at most t can solve the n-CDH problem in G with probability at least .
ε
ε
2.2. Security Definition 
An IBS scheme is secure if it satisfies two requirements, Correctness and Existential Unforgeability.
The standard notion of security for a signature scheme is called existential unforgeability under a 
chosen message attack [12-17], which is defined using the following game between a challenger and an 
adversary A: 
Inti: The adversary first outputs the challenge identity .* * *1( , , )nID v v=  
Setup The challenger runs algorithm KeyGen to obtain a public key PK and a private key SK. The 
adversary A is given PK.
Queries Proceeding adaptively, A requests signatures on at most sq  messages of his choice 1M ,L ,
sq
M ∈ {0, 1}, under PK. The challenger responds to each query with a signature .( ,Sign Mσ = )SKi i
Forgery  A outputs a pair (M, ) and wins the game if (1) M is not any of (σ 1M ,  , sqM ); (2) 
Verify(PK, M, )=Valid.σ
Definition 3  A signature scheme is (t, ) existentially unforgeable under a weak adaptive chosen 
message attack if  no probabilistic polynomial time(running in time at most t) adversary has a non-
negligible advantage  in the above game. 
ε
ε
3.  Our new construction 
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3.1. New scheme  
Setup  Let G be a group of prime order p and g be a random generator of G. Pick , 1  ,α , , nα α 
1, , nβ β , from pZ at random. Set 1g gα= . Then choose 2g ,  randomly in G. The public key is  0 1
PK=(g,
,h h
1g , 2g , ,v), 0 1,h h
 where . The master key is Msk=( ,  , 1 2( , )v e g g= α 1, , nα α 1, , nβ β ). 
Keygen Let 1( , , )nID v v=   denote the user's identity, where . Then the private keys 
corresponding to 
{0,1}iv ∈
ID are generated in the following manner. PKG first generates the auxiliary information 
parameter as follows:  
1
1( )
n v vi i
i ii
nh g
α β −
=
∏
= .
Then the private key is computed as           ,2( )ID nd g h
α
=
where  is outputted as the public key. nh
Sign Message is represented as bit-strings of length n. Let m be a message to be signed. Then pick 
randomly *pr Z∈  and compute the signature as follows: 
1 2 0 1( , ) ( ( ) , )
m r r
IDd h h gσ σ σ= = .
Verify Given the signature , message m and the public keys, verifier accepts the signature if and 
only if the following holds. 
σ
1 1 0 1( , ) ( , ) ( , )
m
ne g ve h g e h hσ σ= 2 .
Correctness:  If  is valid, one can obtain  σ
1( , )e gσ = =0 1( ( ) ,
m r
IDe d h h g) 2 0 1(( ) ( ) , )
m r
ne g h h h g
α
= 2 1 1( , ) ( , )ne g g e h g 0 1(( ) , )
m re h h g
                                                           = .1 0 1 2( , ) ( , )
m
nve h g e h h σ
Efficiency : The well known identity-based signature in the standard model is issued by Paterson[17]. 
But it's signature size is 480 bits. The size of our scheme achieves 320 bits. In addition, the public keys in 
our scheme only contain five group elements, which is also more efficient than scheme in [17]. The 
private keys in the new scheme only have one group element v(  ) is computed in the Setup. 
Hence there are three pairing computations in the Verify. Table 1 gives the comparisons between our 
scheme with other schemes. 
2 1( , )e g g
Table 1. Comparison with other schemes 
Scheme PK size pk size Signature size pairing 
[17] lID+lm+5 2 480-bit 3
Ours 5 1 320-bit 3
In table 1, PK and pk are public key and private key respectively. lID and lm denote the size of identity and 
message. 
3.2.  Security Analysis 
Theorem  If n-CDH assumption holds, then our scheme is secure. 
Proof: Assume that there is an adversary A which breaks the proposed scheme with advantage , we 
then show how to build an adversary B that solves the decisional n-CDH problem with advantage 
ε
2n
ε .
3448  Leyou Zhang et al. / Procedia Engineering 15 (2011) 3445 – 34494 Leyou Zhang et al/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–000 
Algorithm B is given as input a random tuple (g, y1, , yn) where , . B works by 
interacting with A as follows: 
, pc Zα ∈
i
iy g
α
= G∈
Init A first outputs a message that it wants to attack. * * *1( , , )nID v v=  
Setup To generate the system parameters, B sets g1=y1. Then it selects randomly a *pZγ ∈ and sets 
2
ng y gγ= =
n
gα γ+
1
. It chooses  for 1  and sets . The public 
key PK=(g,
*
0 1, , , ,i i pa Zα β λ λ ∈ i n≤ ≤ 00 ,h g hλ= 11 gλ=
g , 2g , , v )are sent to A. The private key are set to ( , , , 1 ). 0 1,h h aα iα α
*
iv
*1 iv
iβ α − i≤ ≤ n
Queries  A issues up to q private queries. Each query qi works as follows:
  Private keys queries. Suppose A asks for private key query corresponding to an identity 
1( , , )i i inID v=
*
i
v 
ijv v≠
. The only restriction is that . It means that there exists at least an j such that 
.  To respond the query, B first derives the auxiliary information parameters as follows: 
*IDiID ≠
11 1
1 1
11 1
1 1
*
1 1
1 *
1 1
v vi i
v vi i
i
i 1
g if v v
h
y if v
α β
α β
−
−
⎧ ≠⎪
= ⎨
≠⎪⎩ v
, ,
12 2
2 2
12 2
2 2
12 2
2 2
    
v vi i
v vi i
v vi i
α β
α β
α β
−
−
−
′
*
2 2
* *
2 1
* *
1
 ,i i
i i
v
v v v
v v
≠
= ∧ =
1
2 1
2
h
h y
y
⎧
′⎪⎪⎨
⎪
⎪⎩
2
2 2
iif v
if v
if v v
= = 1
1
∧ ≠  
Finally, 0 1( , , , )nH h h h=  
*
ij iv v≠
 is obtained. For simplify, we suppose that k denotes the number of 
positions such that . Then one can obtain ( )iID=n kh y
τ ,  where  and .1 ijvj
−
1
ijn
i j
τ α
=
∏( )ID = vjβ k n<
Finally, B sets  the private key for  as iID iIDd = .Thus, B can derive a valid private key for2(g h )
a
n
α
iID .
Notice that, from the received inputs, A gets no information at all about the  chosen by B, thus 
such a choice will be identical to the challenge message with probability 
*ID
1
2n
.
 Signature queries.  Suppose A issues a signature query to a message mi under an 
identity 1( , , )i i inID v v=  . B first generates the private key for iID
r r
 as the previous manner. Then it 
chooses randomly  and generates the signature as follows: pr Z∈
0 1
1 2( , ) ( ) , )i
m gλ λσ σ σ += =
* *
(
iID
d g
σ
.
Forgery  Finally, A  outputs a forged signature   for  M under the identity *ID . Using this 
signature, B can give the solution to the given the n-CDH problem. In fact, 
*
1σ  =
*
2 0 1( ) ( )
a r
ng h h h
α = 2
a a
ng h
α α *
0 1( )h h
r = 1 1 ( )
a a a
n ny g h
γ α
+
0 1( )im rλ λ+g .
If is valid, then  and = .  Hence  *σ
*( )M
n kh y
τ
= ( )anh
α * )(
1
a M
ky
τ
+
1
**
0 1
*
1
1( ) *
2( )
+
1 1
( )a nMa M a
k
y
y g λ λτ γ
σ
σ
−
+
+
= .
Probability Following the above, if A has an advantage  against our scheme, B will solve the n-
CDH problem with advantage
ε
2n
ε .
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we propose a short identity-based signature scheme which is more efficient than other 
schemes proposed so far. Based on the n-CDH problem, we provide a rigorous proof of security for our 
scheme in the standard model. 
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